Recent trends in income redistribution in Australia: Can changes in the tax-benefit system account for the decline in redistribution? by Nicolas Herault (7188581) & Fran Azpitarte (5445674)
Recent Trends in Income Redistribution in Australia:
Can Changes in the Tax-Benet System Account
for the Decline in Redistribution?
Nicolas Heraulty
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research
Francisco Azpitarte
Brotherhood of St Laurence &
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research
Abstract
We examine trends in the redistributive impact of the tax-benet system in
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1 Introduction
Over the previous two decades, Australia has witnessed noticeable economic changes. In
particular, this period of sustained economic growth led to a substantial increase in real
incomes. As recent empirical evidence shows, however, the rise in average living standards
was accompanied by an increase in net income inequality and in the concentration of
incomes at the top of the distribution (Wilkins 2014, Greenville et al. 2013, Atkinson and
Leigh 2007). Importantly, these changes in the mean and dispersion of incomes occurred
in a period of signicant policy changes, especially with respect to the tax and benet
system. In fact, the previous two decades saw the implementation of major scal reforms,
which included, among other things, changes to the income tax rates and thresholds, as
well as, the tightening of the access to welfare payments and reductions in withdrawal rates
of means-tested benets (Australian Senate 2012, Goodger and Larose 1999). Although,
in this context one would naturally wonder what was the role of scal reforms in the
changes in income distribution and redistribution, this remains largely an unexplored
issue. The aim of the present paper is to ll this gap by (i) presenting more evidence on
these recent trends and (ii) by assessing the role played by scal reforms.
First, we study the trends in the redistributive impact of the income tax and ben-
et system in Australia between 1994 and 2009. We report standard measures of the
redistributive e¤ects of taxes, benets and taxes and benets combined. We show the
separate contributions of taxes and benets to overall income redistribution, as well as,
the respective roles of the size and progressivity of taxes and benets.
Time-trends in income redistribution are estimated making use of the cross-sectional
Australian Survey of Income and Housing Cost (SIHC) conducted between 1994 and
2009. The rich socioeconomic and income data collected in the SIHC are then fed into a
tax-benet calculator, the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), to
compute the values of taxes and benets. Hence, redistributive e¤ects and progressivity
measures can be computed avoiding potential measurement errors due to recall bias or
approximate imputation in survey data. The estimated time series reveal signicant
changes in the redistributive impact of the Australian tax-benet system over the 1994-
2009 period. More specically, we nd that after reaching a peak in the late 1990s, the
level of income redistribution achieved by the system signicantly declined in the 2000s
with this decline being largely driven by the fall in the redistributive e¤ect of benets.
Second, we assess the role of tax-benet policy reforms in explaining the trends in in-
come redistribution and income inequality. The 1994-2009 period saw substantial changes
to the income-tax schedule, as well as the implementation of policy reforms like the Work-
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ing Nation package of 1994, the 2003 Australians Working Together, and the 2006 Welfare
to Work reform which all introduced signicant changes to the income support system.
We show that these reforms altered the functional relationship between pre-scal and
post-scal incomes by modifying the budget constraints and the e¤ective tax rates faced
by di¤erent households along the income distribution.
Evidence on the trends in redistribution and the e¤ect of policy reforms on redistrib-
ution over the recent decades is limited. Whiteford (2013, p. 39) computes the redistrib-
utive e¤ect of income taxes and benets between 1981 and 1996, and nds little change
over that period. Using data from the SIHC and the Household Income and Labour Dy-
namics in Australia (HILDA) survey, Wilkins (2014, p. 82) shows that the redistributive
impact of taxes and benets somewhat decreased between 1994 and 2009. These studies,
however, are silent on the distributive consequences of policy reforms as they examine the
trends in income redistribution without controlling for the changes in the distribution of
market income that occurred over the period.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a clear assessment of the impact of
these policy reforms on income redistribution. Our analysis recognizes that any measure
of redistributive e¤ect or progressivity depends on the tax-benet policy parameters but
also on the distribution of income to which taxes and benets are applied. We evaluate the
e¤ect of tax-benet policy reforms using the xed-income approach proposed by Kasten et
al. (1994). This approach allows us to derive time-trends in the redistributive e¤ects and
in the progressivity1 of taxes and benets in the absence of changes in the distribution
of market incomes. This is done by applying the tax and benet schemes of di¤erent
periods to a common distribution of income which allows intertemporal comparisons of
tax-benet policies while controlling for concomitant changes in market incomes. We nd
that although their impact was limited, the tax-benet reforms contributed to the decline
in the redistributive e¤ect of the system in the 2000s. Changes in the distribution of
market income played an important role. These results hold regardless of the distribution
of income taken as reference and are robust to the choice of the equivalence scale and the
degree of aversion to inequality.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the measurement framework
used to measure the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-benet system and the contribution
of taxes and benets to overall redistribution. In Section 3, we present the data and the
features of interest of the tax-benet calculator. In Section 4, we discuss the changes in the
1Note that redistributive e¤ect and progressivity are two distinct features of a redistributive system.
A discussion of these two concepts is provided in the next section.
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redistributive e¤ect of the tax-benet system between 1994 and 2009. Section 5 focuses on
the role of policy reforms. First, we discuss the main policy reforms implemented during
this period and their e¤ects on the relationship between pre and post-scal incomes.
Second, we present the results from the xed-income approach to evaluate the e¤ects of
policy reforms. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
2 Measurement Framework
We anaylse the changes in the redistributive e¤ect of the Australian tax-benet system
using a simple decomposition that allows us to quantify the separate contributions of
taxes and benets to overall redistribution. As is common in the literature on income
redistribution, we focus our analysis on Gini-based measures.2 For the present analysis,
we adopt the widely-used measure of the redistributive e¤ect proposed by Reynolds and
Smolensky (1977) and extended by Urban and Lambert (2008). The redistributive e¤ect
of taxes, benets, or net taxes (taxes minus benets) is given by:
RE = GX  GN (1)
where GX is the Gini index of pre-scal income and GN is the Gini index of post-scal
income after tax, benet, or net tax. Following Lambert (2001) and Kim and Lambert
(2009), we consider market income (pre-tax and benet) as our pre-scal income variable
for the computation of the redistributive e¤ect of net taxes and of benets, whereas for
income taxes the pre-scal variable is gross income dened as the sum of market income
plus benets.3 Table 1 shows the correspondence between pre and post-scal variables
and the di¤erent income variables for taxes, benets and net taxes.
Table 1. Income variables
Tax Benets Net tax
Pre-scal Gross income Market income Market income
Post-scal Net income Gross income Net income
2For a review of the decompositions methods that have been proposed to evaluate the redistributive
e¤ect of scal systems see Urban (2009).
3In the case where some benet payments are taxable, income taxes paid by some individuals may be
larger than their market income. This rules out the use of market income as the pre-scal income for the
computation of standard measures of redistributive e¤ects. The income variables, their components, and
the data used to derive them are discussed in Section 3.
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Within this framework, the redistributive e¤ect of net taxes, RENT , can be expressed
as a function of the separate e¤ects of taxes and benets as:
RENT = RET +REB (2)
where RET and REB are the redistributive e¤ects of taxes and benets, respectively. In
order to understand changes in redistribution, it is useful to distinguish the separate im-
pact of benets and taxes. Following Kakwani (1977, 1984), we express the redistributive
e¤ects as a function of the size and progressivity of taxes and benets minus the e¤ect of
reranking:
RET =
t
1  tP
T  RT (3)
REB =
b
1 + b
jPBj  RB (4)
where t and b are the average tax and benet rates dened as the proportion of aggregate
pre-scal income paid in taxes and received in benets, respectively; P T is the progres-
sivity of taxes as measured by Kawanis disproportionality index and jPBj is the absolute
value of the index for benets; and RT and RB are the measures of reranking that capture
the changes in the ranking of tax units by income in the transition from pre- to post-scal
income.4
Kakwanis progressivity measure is dened as the di¤erence between the concentration
index of taxes or benets and the Gini coe¢ cient for pre-scal income, GX :When taxes
are progressive, the concentration curve of taxes lies below the Lorenz curve of income
which implies a positive value of PK . In the case of benets, a negative value of the index
indicates progressivity. This is because progressive benets are more concentrated at the
bottom so that their concentration curve is above that of income.
4The reranking introduced by taxes or benets is obtained as a residual. It measures the di¤erence
between the concentration index of post-scal incomes, computed with units ranked according to pre-
scal incomes, and the Gini coe¢ cient for post-scal incomes, GX . For a discussion on these measures
see Urban (2009).
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3 Data Sources and Methods
We use the repeated cross-sectional data from the Australian Survey of Income and Hous-
ing Cost (SIHC) conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) between 1994
and 2009. The SIHC is a survey designed to collect detailed information on the income
sources and socioeconomic characteristics of a set of nationally representative households
and their members. In particular, the SIHC provide rich information on the various com-
ponents of labour and capital income that we use to generate the income measures used
in the analysis.5
The values of taxes and benets are based on calculation of entitlements by a tax-
benet calculator, the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), not the
reported receipt.6 MITTS allows the derivation of all major social security and family
payments, rebates and income taxes, ensuring a reasonable approximation to net income
and avoiding potential measurement errors due to recall bias or approximate imputation
in survey data. Benets that are computed include Age and Disability Support pensions,
Widow, Wife and Carer pensions and pensions from the Department of Veterans A¤airs.
Income allowances include Newstart and Youth allowances, as well as, Mature Age, Sick-
ness, Widow, and Partner allowances. Other included payments are parenting payments,
rent assistance, Austudy, ABSTUDY, Special Benets and Family Tax Benet, Parts
A and B. Non cash-benets are not modelled in MITTS and are not considered in the
analysis. For the estimation of income tax liabilities MITTS applies the relevant income
tax schedule (marginal tax rates and income thresholds) as well as the Medicare levy
and surcharge and the various tax rebates, including the Pensioner, Low Income Earner,
Dependent Spouse, and Sole Parent rebates, and the Senior Australians and Mature Age
Workers tax o¤sets and the Family Tax Assistance and Family Tax Payment.
The market income variable is derived from SIHC data and it includes the value
of wages and salaries from all jobs, own unincorporated business income, investment
income including interests, rents, and dividend income, private pensions, and other types
of private income. The self-employed are considered in the anlysis and negative values for
5As documented by Wilkins (2014), there were some changes in the SIHC in the 2000s and it is
impossible to construct fully consistent income series for the 1994-2010 period. We use the most consistent
measures provided in these surveys. In particular, we use a measure of wage and salary income that
consistently excludes salary sacrice and a measure of business and investment income that consistently
excludes income received by silent partners. Most importantly, our conclusions regarding the impact
of tax-benet policy reforms are based on a xed-income approach designed to control for changes in
the distribution of market incomes whether these are genuine or due to changes in the data collection
process (see Section 5.2).
6For a description of MITTS, see Creedy et al.(2002).
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capital income are ignored. Gross and net incomes are computed using the tax amounts
and benet payments calculated by MITTS. Gross income is equal to market income plus
the value of benets whereas net income is equal to gross income net of taxes.
The unit of analysis is the individual, where each individual in an income unit is
assigned the total income of the unit per adult equivalent. Following Banks and Johnson
(1994) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994), the adult equivalent size, s, is obtained using the
following parametric scales:
s = (na + nc)

where na and nc are respectively the number of adults and children in the unit,  is the
weight attached to children and  measures the extent of economies of scale. The weight
attached to children, , was set at 0.6 and the economies of scale parameter was set at
 =0.8. Lastly, all the results are aggregated to the population level using the weights
provided with the SIHC.
4 Income Redistribution in Australia, 1994-2009
Between 1994 and 2009 Australia witnessed a period of strong economic growth that led
to a signicant rise in average real income. As Figure 1 shows, there was a remarkable
increase in both real market and net incomes. By 2009 mean market income was $39,377,
more than $13,000 larger than the mean value in 1994 (in 2009 dollars). The change in
net income was of a similar order of magnitude with the mean growing from $23,803 in
1994 to $35,280 by 2009, which implies an annual growth rate of more than 2.5 per cent.
As documented elsewhere (Wilkins 2014, Greenville et al. 2013, Atkinson and Leigh
2007), the growth in average net income in Australia was accompanied by an increase in
the inequality of its distribution as measured by the Gini index.7 Figure 1 shows that
the Gini coe¢ cient of net income rose by nearly 10 per cent between 1994 and 2007.
Interestingly, this rise in net income inequality took place despite the decline in market
income inequality. The Gini of market income was fairly stable until 2000, when it started
to decline, so that by 2009 the value of this index was almost 5 per cent lower than in
1994. Thus, although income taxes and benets contributed to a more equal distribution
of income in each year (the Gini index for net income is always below that of market
7Wilkins (2014) suggests that even though these trends are apparent in both the HILDA and the
SIHC, they may be somewhat overstated in the SIHC due to the changes introduced by the ABS in the
data collection process in the 2000s.
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income), the diverging trends in market and net income distribution suggest important
changes in the redistributive capacity of Australias scal system for the period under
analysis.
Figure 1. Mean Income and Gini Index, 1994-2009
a) Mean income b) Gini index
Notes: Income variables equivalised as described in Section 3. Mean income values in
2009 dollars. Gini series expressed in index form (1994=100).
Source: Authorscalculations based on MITTS and SIHC data.
Table 2 presents the evolution of the redistributive e¤ects of the net tax, benets and
taxes from 1994 to 2009. The table also shows the separate contributions of taxes and
benets to overall redistribution, as well as, the average tax and benet rates and the
measures of progressivity and reranking. Our estimates show sizeable changes in income
redistribution between 1994 and 2009. After reaching a maximum value in the late 1990s,
when the redistributive e¤ect of the combined tax and benet system, RENT , was above
0.22, a steady decline started so that it had fallen to around 0.17 by 2009, a decline
of nearly 28 per cent.8 Estimates of the separate contributions of taxes and benets
suggest that benets account for most of the redistribution achieved by the scal system.
Despite the downward trend, the contribution of benets to the redistributive e¤ect of
the tax-benet system remained above 63 per cent for the whole period under analysis.
This is in spite of the fact that the magnitude of taxes, as a proportion of income, is
substantially larger than that of benets. In this regard, Australia is similar to most
8To check the robustness of these results we also estimated the redistributive e¤ects for the 2001-10
period using data from the HILDA survey. Results from this analysis available upon request yields very
similar time-trends in income redistribution. See also Wilkins (2014) for a comparison of the time-trends
in income redistribution using SIHC and HILDA data.
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advanced economies, with the notable exception of the US where the tax system plays a
large role in income redistribution (Bastagli et al. 2012).
Both the absolute and relative contribution of benets to redistribution started to
decline in the early 2000s so that the equalizing e¤ect of benets by the end of the decade
was at its lowest level in the period under examination. As the progressivity of benets
barely changed over the period, this decline can be almost entirely attributed to the fall
in the average benet rate, which declined from 16.7 in 2000 to 11 per cent in 2007, the
lowest recorded level of the period. In other words, it is the size of the benet system
that was reduced, not its level of progressivity. Note that the reduced size of the benet
system is to be expected during periods of rapid economic growth as people move out of
income support. Conversely, the economic slowdown following the Global Financial Crisis
of 2008 certainly explains most of the increase in the size and in the redistributive e¤ect
of the benet system between 2007 and 2009.
The redistributive e¤ect of the income tax also declined over the last decade. By
2009, it had declined to 0.061, a reduction of nearly 20 per cent from its peak value of
0.076 recorded in 1999. However, as this fall of was of smaller magnitude than that of
benets, the relative contribution of taxes to overall redistribution increased. In contrast
with benets, the decline in the redistributive e¤ect of taxes is not clearly attributable to
a single factor. The average tax rate shows no clear trend, while tax progressivity tended
to decline between 1997 and 2005, going from a peak value of 0.27 to 0.23, but it then
increased in 2007 and 2009.
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Table 2. Redistributive e¤ect of tax and benets, 1994-2009
Benets (B) Taxes (T)
Year RENT REB (%) b jPBj RB RET (%) t P T RT
1994 0.217 0.153 (70.2) 16.2 1.107 0.002 0.064 (29.8) 20.9 0.251 0.002
1995 0.222 0.156 (70.5) 16.8 1.098 0.002 0.065 (29.5) 20.7 0.256 0.002
1997 0.231 0.157 (68.1) 16.9 1.099 0.002 0.074 (31.9) 21.7 0.270 0.001
1999 0.221 0.145 (65.6) 15.1 1.119 0.002 0.076 (34.4) 23.2 0.256 0.001
2000 0.220 0.153 (69.5) 16.7 1.085 0.002 0.067 (30.5) 20.8 0.260 0.001
2002 0.212 0.144 (68.0) 15.7 1.084 0.003 0.068 (32.0) 21.9 0.248 0.001
2003 0.195 0.128 (65.9) 13.6 1.087 0.002 0.066 (34.1) 22.7 0.232 0.002
2005 0.185 0.119 (64.2) 12.6 1.079 0.002 0.066 (35.8) 23.0 0.226 0.001
2007 0.167 0.105 (63.1) 11.0 1.083 0.002 0.062 (36.9) 20.9 0.237 0.001
2009 0.177 0.115 (65.0) 12.1 1.092 0.003 0.062 (35.0) 20.1 0.251 0.001
Notes: RENT , REB ; RET are the redistributive e¤ects of the next tax, benets and taxes. For taxes and
benets, the number in parenthesis indicates the percentage of overall redistribution accounted by each
of these; b and t are the average benet and tax rates; jPB j and PT are Kakwanis indices of progressivity;
and RB and RT are the reranking measures.
Source: Authorscalculations based on MITTS and SIHC data.
5 The Role of Tax-Benet Policies
5.1 The Australian Tax-Benet System, 1994-2009
Australia has been traditionally described as a liberal welfare regime where strong em-
phasis is placed on the provision of welfare through market mechanisms. Underpinned by
the principle of self-reliance by which every citizen with capacity to work should do so, the
Australian welfare system is aimed to help only those who are most in need, limiting the
tax burden and the overall spending in order to minimize work disincentives. Thus, Aus-
tralia is one of the OECD countries with the lowest levels of tax and social expenditures,
as well as the country with the most targeted system (Whiteford, 2013).
Over the last two decades, similarly to other developed countries, Australias social
security system has seen major reforms clearly aimed at reducing welfare dependency
and promoting self-reliance through paid work (Goodger and Larose 1999, Costello 2006).
Australian scal policy has been subject to a continuous process of reforms, which can be
traced back to the signicant reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that led to the broadening
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of the tax base. These reforms have been mostly driven by the principle of e¢ ciency more
than those of equity and simplicity (Tran-Nam et al. 2006).
Between 1994 and 2009 the tax rate structure underwent multiple changes aimed at
mitigating the negative impact of income taxes and benets on labour supply. The top
marginal rate was unchanged from 1994 to 2005, when it was reduced from 47 to 45 per
cent, the level at which it remained until 2014. But the range of incomes over which
the top marginal tax rate applies was altered due to the large increase in the top tax
threshold. In constant 2009 dollars, the latter went from $75,151 in 1994 to $106,907 in
2005 and to $180,000 in 2009. Changes in the second top rate were also signicant as
it was cut multiple times, falling from 43 per cent in 1994 to 38 per cent by 2009. In
contrast, the real value of the tax-free threshold fell from $8,116 in 1994 to $6,000 in 2009,
which means that low-income tax payers were a¤ected by bracket creep. To mitigate this
e¤ect, the coverage of certain tax o¤sets, in particular the Low Income Tax O¤set, was
extended.
The period between 1994 and 2009 also saw substantial reforms to the income support
system. The 1994 Working Nation package, the 2000 Australia New Tax System, the 2003
Australians Working Together package, the 2006 Welfare to Work reform, and even the
more recent Building Australias Future Workforce reform in 2011 all introduced policy
initiatives to strengthen the incentives to work. This was in part done by reducing the
withdrawal rates of most income-tested government benets. The 100 per cent withdrawal
rate applicable to most allowance payments prior to 1994 was rst reduced to 70 per cent
in 1995 and then to 60 per cent in 2006. As regards family payments, the 1994-2009
period saw a signicant increase in the real value of the withdrawal-free threshold that
determines the eligibility for the maximum rate of family payments. This increase was
accompanied by a reduction in the withdrawal rate that applies for incomes in excess of
the withdrawal-free threshold: in 2000 this rate was cut from 50 to 30 cents in the dollar,
and from 2004 this rate was further reduced to 20 per cent. Interestingly, recent research
shows that despite the emphasis on reducing the disincentives to work, the reforms to
the tax-benet system did not lead to a reduction in the marginal e¤ective tax rates
(METRs) faced by families. This is likely to be due to the large income and employment
growth recorded over the period since people moving from welfare to work tend to face
higher METRs. Harding et al.(2009) and Dockery et al. (2008) nd a substantial shift
in the distribution of e¤ective marginal tax rates since the 1990s with the proportion of
working-age people facing METRs above 50 per cent growing from 4.8 in 1996 to more
than 7 per cent in 2006.
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Policy reforms during the 2000s increased the conditionality of the system by tighten-
ing the access to welfare payments. In the case of unemployment, this was implemented
through tougher activity tests and higher penalties for non-compliance, by extending the
waiting periods for those who have accumulated some savings, and by imposing a two-year
waiting period for new immigrants. Further, the eligibility criterion for the Disability and
Parenting pensions was tightened so that only individuals unable to work more than 15
hours per week and sole parents whose youngest kid is under six were eligible, respec-
tively. As a consequence, some sole parents and people with disabilities have been shifted
from pensions to allowance payments, which may have a¤ected the redistributive e¤ect
of the welfare system given the growing gap between pensions and allowances caused by
di¤erent rules of indexation.9
Figure 2 summarizes the e¤ect of these policy reforms on the relationship between
market and net incomes for some key demographic groups. The gures plot the budget
constraints for couples with and without children, lone parents and singles for the nancial
years 1999/00 and 2007/08, a period which covers major reform packages and corresponds
to the period in which most of the decline in income redistribution occurred (see previous
section).
Before discussing these gures, however, an explanation of how the budget constraints
were constructed is in order.10 First, for each individual of working age in the house-
hold survey, market and net incomes are computed using the tax-benet calculator from
MITTS assuming di¤erent labour supply points ranging from 0 to 50 hours of work and
using observed hourly wage rates.11 Specically, 11 labour supply points were considered
for all individuals except for men in couple for whom only 6 alternatives were used. Hence,
we derive between 6 and 11 points of each individuals budget constraint, which are then
linked by linear extrapolation. This budget constraint, therefore, reects the transforma-
tion of market income, including labour and capital income, into net incomes for di¤erent
labour supply points ranging between 0 and 50 hours.12 The budget constraints shown
in Figure 2 were derived by applying this method on data from the 2007/08 SIHC and
9Since the late 1990s allowances have been indexed to the Consumer Price Index, while pensions are
indexed to the wage index. As a consequence allowance payments have failed to keep pace with the rise
in average income, with a fall of 25 to 35 per cent relative to community living standards (Gregory 2013).
10We are grateful to Justin van de Ven for his help in the development of this approach.
11For those not in work, predicted wages are used, which are derived from a Mincer equation. Details
of the rst set of wage (and labour supply) parameters used in MITTS can be found in Kalb and Scutella
(2002) and Kalb (2002).
12For couples, one members market income at zero hours of work includes observed market income of
the other member. In other words, budget constraints for couple members are constructed by holding
xed the other members market income.
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by averaging over working-age individuals using sample weights. Two sets of budget con-
straints are presented, corresponding to those obtained using the tax and benet systems
of 2007/08 and 1999/2000, respectively.13
Figure 2 reveals that the various policy reforms implemented between 1999/00 and
2007/08 contributed to increase the slopes of the attest parts of the budget constraints
under the 1999/00 system. In other words, the successive reductions in taper rates and
income tax rates ensured that the highest METRs were reduced, in a systematic e¤ort
to increase incentives to work. However, these e¤orts led to asymmetric e¤ects over the
income range. As the gures for the di¤erent groups clearly show, policy reforms acted to
reduce the average e¤ective tax rate of high-income earners. In contrast, policy changes
either did not a¤ect the average e¤ective tax rate at low-income levels, or even increased
it in the case of singles. This was combined with a general reduction in the highest
METRs, a feature which is particularly apparent for couples with children. Within this
group, individuals on annual private incomes between $30,000 to $50,000, who were facing
particularly high METRs under the 1999/00 system, saw large reductions in their METRs
as evidenced by the increased slope of their budget constraints.
Overall, policy reforms between 1999 and 2007 acted to reduce the average e¤ective
tax rate of middle and high-income households in all demographic groups. The reduction
in top marginal income tax rates, the reductions in taper rates, and the increase in family
tax benet payments are all factors that contributed to this trend. This suggests that
these reforms contributed to an increase in disposable income inequality.
13All the payment rates and thresholds from the tax and benet system of 1999/2000 were uprated to
2008 dollars using the ABS wage index based on average earnings for full-time workers. To some extent,
the use of a common uprating factor for all payments and thresholds based on wages rather than the
CPI explains why the 1999/2000 benet system may seem more generous than the 2007/08 system at
low levels of market income in Figure 2. This reects the decisions by policy makers to let allowances
grow more slowly than market income over the period.
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Figure 2. Relationship between market and net incomes, 1999 and 2007
A) Single B) Single-parent
C) Couple D) Couple with children
Notes: C.I. 95 denotes 95% condence interval. In the case of couples, the budget constraints
are those for females. The main qualitative conclusions are the same for males whose budget
constraints are available upon request.
Source: Authorscalculations based on MITTS and SIHC data.
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5.2 Policy Evaluations: The Fixed-Income Approach
The study of scal reforms and their e¤ects on redistribution is relevant from a policy point
of view because it is informative about the governments actions to redistribute income
and it provides valuable information for the design of future reforms. However, policy
reforms are generally implemented as packages combining multiple changes, which means
that their distributional consequences are far from obvious. Moreover, observed changes
in income redistribution over time are the compound result of (i) trends in the distribution
of market incomes and (ii) policy changes that alter the capacity of taxes and benets to
redistribute income. Therefore, assessing the redistributive implications of policy reforms
is not a trivial task as one must be able to isolate the policy e¤ect from the e¤ect of other
changes in the distribution of market income. The xed-income approach proposed by
Kasten et al.(1994) provides a straightforward framework to isolate these e¤ects. Widely
used in the literature on income redistribution and tax policy (for example, see Thoresen
2004, Lambert and Thoresen 2009, Thoresen et al. 2012), this method provides a baseline
for the identication of policy e¤ects by keeping the distribution of market incomes xed
and by applying the tax and benet schemes of di¤erent periods to this distribution of
reference.14
It is important to recognise, however, that this approach only isolates what we could
call the immediate policy e¤ects as it does not account in any way for behavioural re-
sponses to these policy reforms, a point to which we come back below. Another key
issue in this type of analysis is the sensitivity of the conclusions to the choice of the base
distribution. To assess the robustness of our ndings, we identify the policy e¤ect using
three di¤erent pre-scal income distributions as reference, those of 1999, 2000 and 2007.
We nd that our results do not depend on the choice of the reference distribution.
Let F denote the distribution of market income and let NF () represent the distribu-
tion of net income that would result from exposing the distribution F to the scal policy
 . All the information required to evaluate the redistributive e¤ect of the tax-benet
system is then summarized in the pair (F;NF ()). The identication of the policy e¤ect
using the xed-income method requires the application of the scal policy  t from the
14Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) propose an alternative method where the policy e¤ect is identied by
comparing post-scal distributions that have been adjusted to a common base regime in which di¤erences
in market income inequality have been eliminated using a transplant-and-compare procedure. The aim is
to address the main caveat of the xed-income approach, which is that results can depend on the choice
of the base distribution. However, this is a limitation that does not apply here as we shall see that our
results are robust to the choice of the base distribution. Moreover, the transplant-and-compare approach
is not as tractable as the xed-income method, where interpretation is greatly facilitated by the simplicity
of the approach.
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di¤erent periods t = 1; ::; T to a base distribution FB. This allows the construction of
the sequence of pairs f(FB; NFB( t))gTt=1 that can be used to quantify the changes in the
redistributive e¤ect that would have been observed in the absence of changes in the dis-
tribution of market incomes. To derive the distributions of post-scal incomes that result
from applying the tax and benet system from di¤erent years to the common distribution
we make use of the tax-benet calculator component of MITTS. For these simulations
pre-scal incomes are inated (or deated) to the year of the tax and benet system being
considered by using the wage index base on average earnings for full-time workers pro-
vided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.15 Where income tax parameters are varied
independently of the benet parameters, the former are also inated (or deated) to the
year of the benet parameters by using the same wage index.
Figures 3 to 5 show graphically the results from the xed-income analysis. In particu-
lar, the gures show the observed and simulated trends of key indicators of redistribution
for net tax (Figure 3), benets (Figure 4), and income taxes (Figure 5) for the 1994-2009
period. Figure 3.a shows that net income inequality would have increased between 1994
and 2009 even in the absence of any change in the distribution of market incomes. This
is indicated by the upward trend in the Gini index of net income regardless of the base
year used for the evaluation. This means that policy reforms implemented over the pe-
riod contributed to the decline in the redistributive capacity of the tax-benet system by
increasing net income inequality. Figure 3.b suggests that in a scenario with no changes
in the distribution of market income, changes in policies would have led to a decline in
the redistributive e¤ect of taxes and benets of about 5 per cent between 1994 and 2007.
This means, however, that policy reforms can account only for a small part of the overall
decline in redistributive e¤ect over the period, most of which is due to changes in market
income distribution.
The results for benets presented in Figure 4 indicate that reforms to the benet
system cannot account for the large decline in the redistributive e¤ect of benets over the
period. In fact, the simulated series plotted in Figures 4.a and 4.b. show that most of the
variation in the redistributive e¤ect and in the average benet rate observed since 1994
disappear once changes in market incomes are controlled for. In the absence of changes
in market incomes, the redistributive e¤ect of benets would have been reduced by about
5 per cent between 1994 and 2007, well below the 35 per cent fall actually observed in
the data. With regards to the size of benets, the simulated trends indicate that policy
changes alone had a limited impact on the average benet rate with the level of 2009 being
15Australian Bureau of Statistics (cat. no. 6302.0, Table 3, series ID A2734023X).
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very similar to that in 1994 once changes in market income are accounted for. Again, this
implies that the fall in the redistributive e¤ect of benets was largely driven by changes
in market income distribution. This is not particularly surprising as the 1994-2009 period
was a period of strong economic growth and increased employment rates, which translated
into much less reliance on the income support system. In this context, average benet
rates and their redistributive e¤ect are expected to decrease.
In contrast, the results for taxes shown in Figure 5 indicate that changes to the tax
system explain to a large extent the decline in the redistributive e¤ect of taxes over the
1994-2009 period. They show that in the absence of any other changes in the distribution
of gross incomes,16 the redistributive e¤ect of taxes and the average tax rate would have
been about 10 to 15 per cent lower by 2009 than in 1994. Reforms to the tax schedule
explain this decline. Concretely, the various cuts in marginal tax rates and the increase
in the top income thresholds, as well as, the extension of di¤erent tax o¤sets over the
period help to explain the reduction in the share of income paid in taxes, despite rapid
income growth. Interestingly, however, these policy initiatives cannot explain the decline
in tax progressivity observed between 1997 and 2005, although they do explain much of
the upward trend in progressivity between 2005 and 2009. In other words, tax reforms,
and in particular those introduced between 2005 and 2009, led to a more progressive tax
system. Thus, when gross incomes are held xed, the progressivity of the income tax by
2009 is around 5 to 10 per cent higher than in 1994.
16Note that in contrast with benets and net tax where the policy e¤ect is identied holding the
distribution of market income xed, in the case of income taxes the distribution that is held xed is that
of gross income.
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Figure 3 Tax-Benet Policy Evaluations: Net tax, 1994-2009
a) Gini net income (after tax and benets)
b) Redistributive e¤ect
Notes: All series are expressed in index form (1994=100).
Source: Authorscalculations based on MITTS and SIHC data.
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Figure 4. Tax-Benet Policy Evaluations: Benets, 1994-2009
a) Redistributive e¤ect
b) Average benet rate
c) Progressivity
Notes: All series are expressed in index form (1994=100).
Source: Authorscalculations based on MITTS and SIHC data
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Figure 5. Tax-Benet Policy Evaluations: Tax, 1994-2009
a) Redistributive e¤ect
b) Average tax rate
c) Progressivity
Notes: All series are expressed in index form (1994=100).
Source: Authorscalculations based on MITTS and SIHC data
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Conclusions
Over the previous two decades there have been signicant changes in the distribution
of income in Australia. The rise in average income due to rapid economic growth came
along with an increase in net income inequality. This occurred despite the decline in the
inequality of market incomes, which poses an interesting question about the redistribu-
tive capacity of the tax-benet system and how it has been a¤ected by the policy reforms
implemented over the last twenty years. However, research on the trends in the redistrib-
utive impact of taxes and benets in Australia is very limited. In fact, the recent papers
by Whiteford (2010, 2013) and Wilkins (2014) are the only studies that have investigated
this issue to date. Besides complementing these studies by presenting the evolution of a
broader range of redistributive and progressivity measures between 1994 and 2009, this
paper constitutes the rst attempt to identify the specic contributions of tax-benet
policy reforms to recent trends in income redistribution.
Consistent with the results from previous studies, we nd that the redistributive im-
pact of the tax-benet system declined in the period between 1994 and 2007. After
reaching a peak value in the late 1990s, the net redistributive e¤ect of the system started
a steady decline until 2007 so that despite the rise in 2009 the redistributive e¤ect re-
mained nearly 20 per cent lower than in 1994. The analysis show that benets account
for most of the income redistribution in Australia: the contribution of benets to overall
redistribution ranged between 63 and 70 during the period under analysis. However, this
contribution started to decline in the early 2000s. This decline was caused by the fall
in the size of the benet system and not by changes in its progressivity. The decline
in the demand for welfare payments in a period of employment growth, as well as, the
lower growth in welfare payments than in market income, are likely to explain the drop
in average benet rates. Although it is of smaller magnitude, the 1994-2009 period also
saw a decline in the redistributive impact of the income tax. In contrast with benets,
this fall cannot be attributed entirely to a single factor as both changes in the average
tax rate and in progressivity contributed to it.
We investigate the contribution of the tax-benet policy reforms since the mid-1990s
to the observed decline in income redistribution. Previous studies by Whiteford (2010,
2013) and Wilkins (2014) are descriptive in essence and do not consider the role of policy
changes as they are based on summary measures of redistribution that confound changes
in the distribution of pre-scal income with the impact of policy reforms. We isolate the
e¤ect of tax-benet policies using the xed-income approach that allows intertemporal
comparisons of policies by applying the tax and benet schemes of di¤erent periods to a
20
common distribution of market incomes. Our results indicate that net income inequality
would have increased even in the absence of changes in the distribution of market incomes.
This implies that policy reforms contributed to the decline in the redistributive capacity
of the scal system. However, policy reforms only account for a small part of the decline
in income redistribution, most of which was explained by changes in the distribution of
market incomes.
Although useful to isolate the immediate impact of policy reforms, the xed-income
analysis provides no insight on the other factors underlying the changes in income redis-
tribution. In particular, it remains silent about the factors behind the changes in market
incomes and the extent to which these are induced by behavioral responses to policy re-
forms. Shedding light on these issues calls for the development of new and more complex
analytical approaches. This is the subject of much-needed ongoing research (see Bargain
2012, Creedy and Herault 2011 and Herault and Azpitarte 2014).
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